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I. INTRODUCTION 
An important anniversary went uncelebrated in the Harvard 
Law Review's most recent review of the previous United States 
Supreme Court term. 1 The November 2006 issue marked the fif-
tieth year that the Harvard Law Review published its annual ma-
trix of the inter-agreement amongst all of the Justices for a par-
ticular term. 2 These matrices include both raw numbers and 
Electronic Services Librarian. Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington: 
Doctoral Student. School of Library and Information Science (SUS). Indiana University-
Bloomington. (JD University of Kansas 1997, MSLIS University of Illinois 2000). Mr. 
Hook researches in the area of information visualization. Particular interests include the 
educational use of knowledge domain visualizations. concept mapping, and the spatial 
navigation of bibliographic data in which the underlying structural organization of the 
domain is conveyed to the user. Additional interests include social network theory. 
knowledge organization systems. legal bibliometrics. and legal informatics. (The follow-
ing website contains color versions of the visualizations used in this article: 
http://ella.slis.indiana.edu/-pahook/index.html.) 
1. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term. 120 HARV. L. REV. 372. 372-84 (2006). 
2. The Harvard Law Review first published the annual matrix in 1957 (regarding 
the 1956 Term). and has provided annual matrices ever since. See The Supreme Court. 
l'J56 Term. 71 HARV. L. REV. 84. 103 (1957): The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. 
L. REV. 96. 103 (1958): The Supreme Court, ]')5/i Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 128. 133 
(1959): The Supreme Court, 1959 Term. 74 HARV. L. REV. 95. 105 (1960): The Supreme 
Court, 1960 Term. 75 HARV. L. REV. 80. 89 (1961): The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 75. 85 (1962): The Supreme Court, 1962 Term. 77 HARV. L. REV. 79. 87 
(1963): The Supreme Court, 1963 Term. 78 HARV. L. REV. 177. 183 (1904): The Supreme 
Court, l'JM Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 103.109 (1965); The Supreme Court, ]')65 Term. 80 
HARV. L. REV. 123. 145 (1966): The Supreme Court, 1966 Term. 81 HARV. L. REV. 110. 
131 (1967): The Supreme Court, 19{57 Term. 82 HARV. L. REV. 93. 307 (1968): The Su-
preme Court, Noli Term. 83 HARV. L. REV. 60. 279 (1969): The Supreme Court, /';)6') 
Term. 84 HARV. L. REV. 30. 252 (1970): The Supreme Court, l'J70 Term, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 38. 351 (1971): The Supreme Court, 1971 Term. 86 HARV. L. REV. 50. 301 (1972): 
The Supreme Court, l'J72 Term. 87 HARV. L. REV. 55. 304 (1973): The Supreme Court, 
1973 Term. 88 HARV. L. REV. 41,275 (1974): The Supreme Court, 1974 Term. 89 HARV. 
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percentages as to how often any two Justices sided together on 
cases for that particular term relative to the amount of cases the 
two Justices heard together.' Aggregating this data over the fifty-
year span allows for some important insights and benchmarks as 
to the last half century of the Supreme Court-the 1956 to 2005 
Terms. Given how often these or similar statistics are cited,4 
emulated,' compiled and/or reproduced," the aggregated, longi-
L. REV. -17.276 (1975): The Supreme Court, 7975 Term. 90 HARV. L. REV. 56,277 (1976): 
The Supreme Court, 7976 Term. 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 296 (1977); The Supreme Court, 
1977 Term. 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 32H (197H): The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 60. 276 (1979): The Supreme Court, 1979 Term. 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 290 (19HO): 
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term. 95 HARV. L. REV. 91. 340 (19H1 ): The Supreme Court, 
1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62,305 (19H2); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 70. 2'16 (1'1H3): The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 9H HARV. L. REV. H7. 30H (19H4): 
The Supreme Court. 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120. 323 (19H5): The Supreme Court, 
1985 Term. 100 HARV. L. REV. 100. 305 (19H6): The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 119.363 (19H7): The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143. 
351 (1'1HH): The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137,395 (19H9): The Su-
preme Court, 1989 Term. 104 HARV. L. REV. 129. 360 (1'190): The Supreme Court. 1990 
Term, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177,420 (19'11); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 163. 379 (1992): The Supreme Court, 1992 Term. 107 HARV. L. REV. 144,373 (1 '1'13): 
The Supreme Court, 1993 Term. lOR HARV. L. REV. 13'1. 373 (1'194): The Supreme Court, 
1'194 Term, 10'1 HARV. L. REV. 111. 341 (1'1'15): The Supreme Court, 1995 Term. 110 
HARV. L. REv. 135. 36H (1996): The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197. 
432 (19'17): The Supreme Court, 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 367 (199H): The Su-
preme Court, 1998 Term. 113 HARV. L. REV. 400.401 (199'1); The Supreme Court, 1999 
Term- The Swtistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 391 (2000): The Supreme Court, 2000 Tern!. 
115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 540 (2001 ); The Supreme Court, 2001 Term. 116 HARV. L. REV. 
453. 454 (2002): The Supreme Court, 2002 Term. 117 HARV. L. REV. 4HO. 4H1 (2003}: The 
Supreme Court, 2003 Term, 11H HARV. L. REV. 4'17. 499 (2004); The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term. 11 '1 HARV. L. REV. 415, 421 (2005): The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 372. 374 (2006). Hereinafter, each of the annual articles will be cited as follows: The 
(year/ Term. For example, the issue addressing the 2005 Term will be cited as The 2005 
Term. 
3. See supra note 2. 
4. See, e.g .. Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1019. 1030 (2006): Walter E. Joyce, The Early Constituloinal Jurispru-
dence of Justice Stephen G. Breyer.· A Study of the Justice's First Year on the United States 
Supreme Courl. 7 SETON HALL. CONST. L.J. 149. 16l:Michael Stokes Paulsen, Counting 
Heads on RFRA. 14 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 12 (19'17): Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the 
Supreme Court Agenda· An Empirical Analysis. 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727. 72H (2001 ): 
Stephen J. Wermiel. Clarence Thomas Ajier Ten Years: Some Reflections, 10 AM. U.J. 
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 315,316 (2002}. 
5. See Mark Tushnet. Taking Sides: Many Believe Political Dtjferences Rend the 
Rehnquisl Court. 8111 More Than Politics Are in Play, LEGAL AFFAIRS. Mar.-Apr. 2005, 
at 3H, availahle at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2005/numbers_ 
marapr05.msp. At least one group of authors has repeatedly applied the Harvard Law 
Review's format and methodology to the voting patterns of the Indiana Supreme Court: 
the Indiana Law Review has covered the voting patterns of the justices on the Indiana 
Supreme Court since its 1 '1'11 term. See, e.g., Mark J. Crandley et al., An Examination of 
the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 2005. 39 IND. L. REV. 733 
(2006): Kevin W. Betz. An Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Disposi-
tions, and Voting in 1991, 25 IND. L. REV. 146'1 (1 '192). 
Others have done a similar analysis as to various state supreme courts. See Christine 
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tudinal data should be of interest to scholars, commentators, law 
students, and the public at large. 
Furthermore, these aggregated matrices of agreement allow 
for interesting visualizations of the Supreme Court, both longi-
tudinally and year by year. Using existing software, measures of 
agreement (and disagreement) allow for the Justices to be dis-
tributed spatially as to their ideological sympathies. Such spatial 
visualizations quickly convey to the viewer which Justices are of-
ten in agreement, which are seldom in agreement, and which 
Justices are outliers. The fifty-year perspective also allows schol-
M. Motta, Note, The Supreme Court of Alaska: Unique and Independent Like the People 
of the Last Frontier. 60 ALB. L. REV. 1727,1752 (1997): Stephen R. Barnett, Forward. 
The Emerging Court. 71 CAL. L. REV. 1134. 1193 (1983): Nathan J. Kunz et al., Note. 
Colorado Supreme Court Swtistiwl Survey, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 605 (2005): Shane R. 
Heskin. Note, Florida's State Constitlllional Adjudication. A Significant Shiji as Three 
New Memhers Take Seats on !he State's Highest Court?. 62 ALB. L. REV. 1547 (1 999): 
Robert Bradley & S. Sidney Ulmer. An Examination of Vo!ing Behavior in !he Supreme 
Court of 11/inois: 1971-1975. 5 S. ILL. U. L.J. 245 (1 980): Annual Review of Maryland Law: 
Cour£ of Appeals of Maryland, 1995-96 Opinions. 26 (1) U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1991i): 
Robert A. Marangola, Note. Independent State Consti1111ional Adjwlicalion in Massachu-
sells: 1988-1998, li1 ALB. L. REV. 11i25. 11i75 (1998): Luke Bierman, The Dynamics of 
Slale Conslitulional Decision-Making: Judicial Behavior a1 the New York Cour£ of Ap-
peals, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1403 (1995): Vincent Martin Bonventre, Cour£ of Appeals-State 
Constilutional Law Review, 1990, 12 PACE L. REV. 1 (1992) (discussing the New York 
Court of Appeals): Harry C. Martin. S!a!isliwl Compilmiun of the Opinions of !he Su-
preme Court of North Carolina Terms 1989-90 Through 1992-93. 72 N.C. L. REV. 1453 
(1 994); Michael West, Note, Arre.wed Developmenl: An Analysis of !he Oregon Supreme 
Court'.\" Free Speech Jurisprudence in the Pos£-Linde Years, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1237 (2000): 
Glynna K. Parde, Note, Judicial Decision Making: A Suaistical Analysis uf the Tennessee 
Supreme Court-1992 Term, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 325 (1994): James E. Bond & Kelly 
Kunsch, A Sw1e Supreme Cour£ in Transiliun, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 545 (2002) (dis-
cussing the Washington Supreme Court). 
There is at least one study as to the voting alignment of a particular Federal Court of 
Appeals. Harry T. Edwards, Puhlic Misperceptions Concerning !he "Polilics" of Judging: 
Dispelling Some Myths Ahout the D.C. Circuit, 51i U. COLO. L. REV. 619.644 (1985) (DC 
Circuit). 
There is also at least one study on intermediate state appellate courts. See Rochelle 
Block & Jeffrey Laynor, Note. The Work of !he Cotm uf Appeals: A Swtislical Miscel-
lany: July I, 1985 Through June 30, 1986, 46 MD. L. REV. 891, 898 (1 987) (The star(*) 
footnote of this work cites several previous Maryland studies. including William L. Rey-
nolds, II, The Coun of Appeals of Maryland: Rules, Work a/1{1 Perj(Jrmance- Par£ I. 37 
Mo. L. REV. 1, 40-56 (1 977) (September 1975 Term) and others.). 
li. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen. The Mosl Dangerous Ju.wice Rides Again: 
Revisiling !he Power Pageant of the Justices. 86 MINN. L. REV. 131. 190-191 (2001 ): Paul 
H. Edelman & Jim Chen. The Mosl Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Courl at the Bar of 
Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. li3. 90 (1991i): Brian K. Landsberg. Race and the 
Rehnquis£ Court. 66 TUL. L. REV. 1267. 1346-52 (1992): Linda Greenhouse. Cour£ in 
Transition: News Analysis; Comistemly, A Pivotal Role. N.Y. TIMES. July 2. 2005. at A1 
(including a chart titled. "Agreement Among Supreme Court Justices: Percentage of 
Times That Justices Agreed in Non-Unanimous Cases from the 1994-95 Term Through 
the 2003-04 Term"): Linda Greenhouse, Roher£.\" Is at Court's Helm, But He /sn 't Yet in 
Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2. 2001i. at 1 (including a chart titled. "Percentage of Times 
That Pairs of Justices Agreed in Nonunanimous Decisions in the 2005-Uii Term"). 
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ars of the court to set empirical benchmarks to evaluate individ-
ual terms. For instance, the 2005 term, with an aggregate agree-
ment of 70%, was the high water mark for agreement amongst 
the Court over the past 50 terms. 7 At least one scholar has de-
scribed this as a "quiet term."~ Now, with the Aggregate Har-
mony Metric, we can empirically demonstrate that the term was 
unique. It was indeed a statistical outlier, a bit removed from the 
mean of 60% total Justice agreement for the fifty-year span. 
II. PRIOR WORK 
A. VOTING ALIGNMENTS 
The genesis for voting alignment matrices appears~ to be the 
work of C. Herman Pritchett in 1941. 10 Pritchett's 1941 article 
contains a matrix of percentage agreement among the Justices in 
controversial cases during the 1939 and 1940 Terms. 11 After a 
similar article in 1942 (which includes a table of the percentage 
agreement among the Justices in all non-unanimous cases for the 
1941 Term (Chart III)), 12 Pritchett produced a lengthier treat-
ment of the subject in a 1948 book. 1' Table XXII of this work 
consists of matrices of percentage agreements for all members of 
the Court for all non-unanimous opinions of the Court for the 
1931 through 1946 Terms. 14 A subsequent work by Pritchett con-
tains matrices of percentage agreements for all members of the 
court for non-unanimous opinions of the Court for the 1946-1948 
Terms (Table 5) 15 and the 1949-1952 Terms (Table 7). 1" 
In addition to the Harvard Law Review, others have pub-
lished voting alignment and other data about the various terms 
7. See infra Table 1 and Chart 1. 
H. See Frederick Schauer. Forward, The Court's Agenda-and the Nation's. 120 
HARV L. REV. 4. 32 (2006). 
'}_ See J. Woodford Howard. Jr.. Commentary. 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 533,543 (11.}1.}5). 
10. C. Herman Pritchett. Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, I':i3':i-l':i4l. 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. H90. (1941). For a discussion of Pritchett's work 
and other similar contributions, see Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of 
Judging. 47 ST. LOuiS U. L.J. 7H3. 7H6 (2003): G. Edward White. Unpacking the Idea of 
the Judicial Cenrer, H3 N.C. L. REV. 10H9 (2005). 
11. Pritchett. supra note 10. at H94 tbl. Ill. 
12. C. Herman Pritchett. The Vming Behavior of the Supreme Court, /1)4/-42. 4 J. 
POL. 491.497 tbl. III (1942). 
13. C. HERMA:--; PRITCHETT. THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
POLITICS AND VA LUES 1937-1 1.}47 (1 94H). 
14. /d. at 240-4H. 
15. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT. CiVIL LiBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 1H2 
(11.}54). 
16. /d. at 1H4. 
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of the Court. John Sprague published voting alignment data for 
as early as 1916. 17 At least as early as for the 1995 term, United 
States Law Week has published voting alignment matrices. 1x In 
addition, The National Law Journal also publishes voting align-
ment data. 1 ~ 
Since the 1986 Term, a group of scholars has been publish-
ing annual reviews of the Supreme Court with data such as lib-
eral and conservative trends, voting for the government versus 
voting for private parties, breakdowns by civil and criminal 
cases, and other distinctions.2" Similar data is published in the 
wonderfully detailed book, The Supreme Court Compendium: 
Data, Decisions & Developments. 21 This work includes voting 
alignments by issue area: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First 
Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Eco-
nomics, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Fed-
eral Taxation, and Miscellaneous. 22 The data for these tables 
comes from a freely available database known as the U.S. Su-
preme Court Judicial Database. 2' 
The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database was created by 
political scientist, Harold J. Spaeth,2" and is widely used by the 
political science community. The database has been cited by law 
school scholars, and some note its discrepancies2' with the Har-
17. JOHN D. SPRAGUE. VOTING PATTERNS OF THE CNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT: CASES IN FEDERALISM. 1889-1959 (1968). 
18. Thomas C. Goldstein. Statistics /{Jr the Supreme Court's Ouoher Term ]')95. 65 
U.S.L.W. 3029 (1996). 
19. Marcia Coyle, An Activist Court Rules on Speech, Immigration and One Big 
Election, NAT'L L.J .. Aug. 6. 2001. at C1 (including table titled "Voting Alignments on 
the Supreme Court"): Marcia Coyle. New Trio Stands Up w Court's Hard Right. NAT'L 
L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at S1 (including table titled ''Voting Alignments on the Supreme 
Court: 1991-92 Term"). 
20. Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 
15 (1988); Richard G. Wilkins et al.. Supreme Court Voting Behavior 2004 Term. 32 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 909 (2005). 
21. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL.. THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA. DECISIONS 
& DEVELOPMENTS (3d ed. 2003). 
22. /d. at 524-87 (including tables for the Vinson Court. 1946-1952 Terms (Table 6-
4 ): the Warren Court, 1953-1968 Terms (Table 6-5 ); the Burger Court. 1969-1985 Terms 
(Table 6-6); and the Rehnquist Court. 1986-2001 Terms (Table 6-7)). 
23. The S. Sidney Ulmer Project: U.S. Supreme Court Databases. 
http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm. 
24. hi.; see a/so JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HARLOLD J. SPAETH. THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002): JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 32-73 (1993): Harold J. 
Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal. The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base: Providing New 
Insights into the Court. 83 JUDICATURE 228 (2000). 
25. See Geraldine Mund. A Look Behind the Ruling: The Supreme Court and the 
Unconstitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 78 AM. BANKRUPTCY L.J. 401. 421 
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vard Law Revie1v statistics. In the future I plan to compare my 
results from the Harvard Law Review data against those from 
the Supreme Court Database. Some feel that the Supreme Court 
Database is more nuanced and transparent as to the processing 
and categorization of the data.2" I personally found several minor 
errors and inconsistencies with the Harvard statistics27 and found 
myself wanting more information as to how the Harvard statis-
tics were compiled. 2' 
B. VISUALIZATIONS OF VOTING ALIGNMENTS 
Over the years there have been several efforts to spatially 
visualize the relationship of the Justices to one another. 2y In 
1941, Pritchett published a linear continuum of the Justices in 
the 1939 and 1940 Terms based on their number of dissents.'" In 
1951, Thurston and Degan used factorial analysis of the voting 
patterns of the 1943 and 1944 Terms to produce three dimen-
sional vector space representations of the Justices.' 1 Starting in 
1962, Schubert used multidimensional factor analysis (or scaling) 
of Justice voting behavior to produce spatial distributions of the 
(2004): 
26. See Epstein et al., supra note 10. 
27. For example, the article concerning the 1967 Term uses the wrong N value for 
Justice Marshall relative to Justice Black. The N value should be 70 instead of 170 to be 
consistent with the other N values for Justice Marshall and the resultant percentages in 
the five year table on p. 311 of the same volume. See The 1967 Term, supra note 2, at 307, 
311. For the 1977 Term. the P value should be 91.9 rather than 93.6, based on the 0, S, T, 
& N values given for Justice Marshall relative to Justice Brennan. See The 1977 Term, 
supra note 2. at 328. For the 1985 Terms. there is a discrepancy as to theN value of Jus-
tice Powell relative to Justice White. It is 155 on one half of the matrix and 156 on the 
other half. The 1985 Term. supra note 2. at 305. I used the 155 value for my calculations 
as Justice Powell did not sit with any other Justice 156 times for that particular Term. 
However, he did sit with several other Justices a total of 155 times. 
28. For example. Table C and note I in the section addressing the 1956 Term statis-
tics indicate that there were thirty-three unanimous cases for the 1956 Term, "[i]ncluding 
S cases decided with concurring votes." The 1956 Term, supra note 2, at 103. Does this 
mean concurring in the judgment and the reasoning. or just the judgment? In the later 
case. only 25 are truly unanimous by later Harvard standards. 
29. See G. Edward White, Unpacking che Idea of che Judicial Cencer, H3 N.C. L. 
REV. 1089 (2005) (discussing early statistical efforts that have produced spatial distribu-
tions of the Justices in order to find the spatial or ideological center of the Supreme 
Court). 
30. Pritchett. supra note X, at 894. For a more recent approach as to linear, spatial 
modeling taking into account more variables and in the context of the confirmation proc-
ess see Jeffrey A. Segal eta!.. A Spacial Model of Roll Call Vocing: Senawrs, Conscicuencs, 
Presidencs, and lnceresc Groups in Supreme Courc Confirnwciuns, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 
(1992). 
31. L.L. Thurstone & J.W. Degan. A Facwrial Scwly of che Supreme Cmm, 37 
PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 628 (1951). 
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Justices.'2 In 1985, Spaeth and Altfeld produced spatial, though 
non-automated, diagrams of the influence relationships amongst 
the Justices for the Warren and Burger Courts." More recently, 
Martin and Quinn used Markov chain Monte Carlo methods 
with a Bayesian measurement model to produce spatial distribu-
tions of Justices based on their voting behavior." 
Other political scientists are using other statistical tech-
niques based in part on voting behavior to produce spatial distri-
butions of the Justices." Network science researchers Johnson, 
Borgatti, and Romney have used network science and corre-
spondence analysis techniques to produce visual representations 
of the later Rehnquist Court voting patterns.'" Mathematician, 
Lawrence Sirovich, used vector models and singular value de-
composition to produce two dimensional representations of the 
voting patterns of the Rehnquist Court.'7 In addition, there have 
been numerous line charts showing various aspects of the work 
of the court. For instance, Epstein and her collaborators pub-
lished a line chart showing the "Percentage of U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases with at Least One Dissenting Opinion, 1800-2000 
Terms."'x 
32. Glendon Schubert. Judicial Attillldes and Vo1ing Behavior: The 196/Term ofihe 
Uni1ed Siales Supreme Coun, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100 (1963): Glendon Schu-
bert. The l960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis. 56 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 90 (1962). 
33. Harold J. Spaeth & Michael F. Altfeld, Influence Relationships wilhin Lhe Su-
{Jreme Courr: A Comparison of rhe Warren and Burger Courrs, 38 W. POL. Q. 70-83 
(1985). 
34. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn. Dynamic Ideal Point Ewinzation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo jiJr the U.S. Supreme Court, l953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 
134 (2002): see also Epstein et al.. supra note 10. at 797: Andrew D. Martin et al.. The 
Median Jusrice on the United States Supreme Courl. 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005): Lee Ep-
stein et al., Ideological Driji Among Supreme Court Jusrices: Who When, and How lm-
ponmu~. 102 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). availahle at http://www. 
law.northwestern.edu/lawrcvicw/Colloquy/2007/8/LRColl2007n8Epstein.pdf. 
35. See Lee Epstein et al.. The Judicial Common Space (April 14. 2005) (research 
paper prepared for the Northwestern Faculty Conference, Law and Positive Political 
Theory: Legal Doctrine and Political Control. April 29. 2005). availahle at 
h t tps :/ /www .Ia w. northwestern .ed u/facul ty /conferences/research/Epstein. pdf. 
36. Jeffrey C. Johnson et al.. Analysis of Voting Patterns in U.S. Supreme Court 
Decisions (February 16-20. 2005) (research paper prepared for Sunbelt XXV. Inter-
national Sunbelt Social Network Conference. Redondo Beach. CA). abstract availahle ar 
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/-ssnconflconf/SunbeltXXVProgram.pdf. 
37. Lawrence Sirovich. A pattern analysis of' the second Rehnquisr U.S. Supreme 
Cmm. 100 PNAS 7432 (2003). 
38. Epstein et al.. supra note 10. at 787. 
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C. MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING (MDS) AND THE LAW 
As this article utilizes Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), it is 
appropriate to survey the use of the technique by legal scholars 
generally, as well as those that have used it to produce spatial 
distributions of Supreme Court Justices based on their voting 
behavior. Most references in the law review literature are either 
by psychologists or health professionals, people citing psycholo-
gists or health professionals, people writing about psychological 
or health themes, or in law and psychology or law and health re-
lated journals.'~ For instance, Blumenthal used multidimensional 
scaling to produce spatial distributions of various crimes based 
on the public's perception of the seriousness of the various 
crimes.411 Also, there is a group of scholars that has employed 
MDS to map social networks associated with various legal issues. 
These publications include spatial maps of the networks 41 that 
are very similar to those produced in information science or so-
cial network science. Additionally, this author did a MDS analy-
sis of top level West Topics in Supreme Court opinions over a 
sixty year span with the goal of creating a domain map of the 
Supreme Court topic space for teaching purposes.42 
The use of MDS to produce visualizations of voting patterns 
in courts appears to have originated from its use to produce 
visualizations of Congressional roll-call votes.4' Grofman and 
Brazill have applied MDS to voting patterns of the Supreme 
Court. However, their focus has been to reduce the multidimen-
39. See Michael T. Heaney, Brokering Health Policy: Coalitions, Parties, and In· 
terest Group Influence, 31 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 887 (2006); Maggie E. Reed et al.. 
There's No Place Like Home; Sexual Harassment of Low Income Women in Housing. 11 
PSYCHOL .. PUB. POL'Y, & L. 439 (2005); 
40. Jeremy A. Blumenthal. Perceptions of Crime: A Multidimensional Analysis with 
Implications f!Jr Law and Psychology, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). avail· 
ahle at http://ssrn.com/abstract=942311 
41. John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and 
Social Distance, 37 L. & Soc'y REV. 5, 25, 31 (2003); John P. Heinz et al., The Constitu-
encies of Elite Urhan Lawyers, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 441, 444, 452. 458 (1997); John P. 
Heinz & Peter M. Manikas. Networks Among Elites in a Local Criminal Justice System, 
26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 831, 842, 847 (1992); Robert L. Nelson et al., Lawyers and the 
Struclllre of Influence in Washington, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 237, 289 (1988). 
42. Peter A. Hook, Visualizing the Topic Space of the United States Supreme Court. 
(Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 68), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=948759. Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Scientometrics 
and Informetrics (ISS! 2007), Madrid. Spain, June 25-27, pp. 387-96. working paper ver-
sion (June 22. 2007). 
43. See KEITH T. POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING (2005): 
Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill. Identifying the Median .Justice on the Supreme 
Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of "Nalllral Courts" 1953-1991. 112 
PUB. CHOICE 55. 55 n.1 (2002). 
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sional space to one dimension. In other words, they use MDS to 
produce a linear continuum of the Justices serving on any par-
ticular natural court (composed of nine Justices) to identify the 
central or median Justice."4 At least one scholar has produced 
two dimensional layouts of a particular Court term using MDS.45 
However, the resultant visualizations are contained on a course 
website and appear to be more of a demonstration of the tech-
nique than an attempt to garner insight into the Supreme 
Court!" 
D. NETWORK VISUALIZATIONS AND THE LAW 
Because this article uses network visualization techniques to 
visualize the relationship of the Justices based on their voting 
behavior, it is appropriate to survey the growing body of legal 
scholars doing similar work with legal networks. Smith, Cross 
and their collaborators utilize a dataset of the citation interlink-
ages of every federal and state case on Lexis as well as the cita-
tion interlinkages of 385,000 legal journal articles. 47 Chandler 
utilizes the software program Mathematica to evaluate a dataset 
of the citation interlinkages amongst Supreme Court cases from 
1831 to 2005."" Chandler has also written on the network struc-
ture of the Uniform Commercial Code!~ Political scientist 
Fowler and his collaborators also utilize the citation interlink-
ages for Supreme Court cases retrieved by automated means 
from Lexis to identify outwardly important cases and inwardly 
important cases.'" The CITE-IT Project analyzes the citation 
network of federal level regulatory takings cases.'' 
44. Grofman & Brazill. supra note 43. 
45. See Poli JOOB Congress. 2 February 2006. http://voteview.com/congress_ 
UCSD_2_February_2006.htm. 
46. /d. 
47. Frank B. Cross. Thomas A. Smith. & Antonio Tomarchio. Determinants of Co-
hesion in the Supreme Court's Network of Precedents (Aug. 2006) (U of Texas Law, Law 
and Econ Research Paper No. 90. San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-67). availahle at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract='i24110: Frank B. Cross & Thomas A. Smith, The Reagan Revo-
lution in the Network of Law (June 2006), availahle at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217: 
Thomas A. Smith, The Weh of Law (Spring 2005) (San Diego Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 06-11), availahle at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642H63. 
4H. Seth J. Chandler. The Network Structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence (June 
10. 2005) (University of Houston Law Center No. 2005-W-07). availahle at 
http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract= 7 42065. 
49. Seth J. Chandler. The Network Structure of the Uniform Commercial Code: It's 
A Small World After All (2005) (paper presented at the 2005 Wolfram Technology Con-
ference). availahle at http:/ /library. wolfram.comlinfocen ter/Conferences/SROO/. 
50. James H. Fowler et al .. Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Im-
portance of Supreme Court Precedents. 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007): James H. Fowler. 
Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks. 14 POL. ANALYSIS 456 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA HARVESTING AND MATRIX ALGEBRA 
The data for this article comes mostly from the Harvard 
Law Review's annual statistical review of the Supreme Court 
term.'2 The author placed each year's data into a standardized 
spreadsheet matrix that had columns and rows for each Justice 
that participated in an issued opinion during the applicable time 
span-the 1956 to 2005 Terms (roughly October 1956 to July 
2006).'' The author created one such spreadsheet per term for 
each of the different Harvard Law Review counting methods 
(0,'" S,'' D,'" N'7)'~. Relying on a consistent ordering of the Jus-
(2006): James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon. The Aurhoriry of Supreme Courr Precedenl. 
Soc. NETWORKS (forthcoming 2007), availahle ar http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/ .. 
51. Wayne Mcintosh et al.. Using Information Technology to Examine the Com-
munication of Precedent: Initial Findings and Lessons From the CITE-IT Project (Mar. 
17-llJ. 2005) (paper prepared for the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Sci-
ence Association. Oakland. California). availahle a£ http://www.bsos.umd. 
edu/gvpt/CITE- !T/Documen ts/Mcl ntosh% 20etal% 202005% 20WPSA.pdf. 
52. See supra note 2. 
53. See infra Table 2. 
54. The 0 method counts the number of agreements in "opinions of the Court (0)" 
as indicated by the cell corresponding with any two Justices for that particular term. The 
JY56 Term, supra note 2. at 103 tbl. IV. n.k. Subsequent issues would define the method 
as follows: " ·o· represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices 
agreed in an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court." 
The 2005 Term. supra note 2, at 376 tbl. I. n.g. 
55. The S method counts the number agreements in ''separate opinions including 
concurrences and dissents" as indicated by the cell corresponding with any two Justices 
for that particular term. The JY56 Term. supra note 2. at 103 tbl. IV. n.k. Subsequent is-
sues would define the method as follows: " 'S' represents the number of decisions in 
which two Justices agreed in any opinion separate from the opinion of the Court. Justices 
who together join more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have 
agreed only once." The 2005 Term. supra note 2. at 376 tbl. I. n.g. The language as to Jus-
tices who "join more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have agreed 
only once," did not come about until the llJlJ6 Term. The JYY6 Term. supra note 2. at 433 
tbl. I. n.f. Thus. one would have to look at actual cases and voting patterns to see if the 
method was done consistently over the entire dataset. 
56. The D method was introduced for the review of the llJH7 term." 'D' represents 
the number of decisions in which the two Justices agreed in either a majority. dissenting. 
or concurring opinion." The JY87 Term, supra note 2. at 252 tbl. I. n.f. It was in response 
to the problem of aggregated 0 and S totals leading to greater than 100 percent agree-
ment. See id. ("It should be noted that the 'P' totals have been computed differently than 
they have in past versions of this table. In the past. the 'P' line was calculated by dividing 
the sum of the '0' and'S' lines by 'N.' This method of calculation overstated P whenever 
two Justices had agreed more than once in any one decision.") 
57. TheN method counts "the number of times that the Justices participated in the 
same case." The JY56 Term. supra note 2. at 103 tbl. IV. n.k. Subsequent definitions were 
very similar:" 'N' represents the number of decisions in which both Justices participated. 
and thus the number of opportunities for agreement." The 2005 Term. supra note 2. at 
376 tbl. I, n.g. 
5H. The T method is merely the count of overall agreement. 0 plus S. Because this 
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tices, it was then easy to aggregate the data for each of the indi-
vidual terms using Microsoft Excel. In other words, for each 
method type (0, S, D, and N), the author created one workbook 
file that had fifty individual sheets whose cell contents could eas-
ily be aggregated on the fifty-first sheet using the function: 
SUM(Sheet1:Sheet50!E3) where E3 was a particular cell. Thus, 
the Aggregate Harmony Metric is the aggregation of all 0 cells 
divided by the aggregation of all N cells (IO I IN ). These per-
centages were easily generated with a simple Excel function such 
as: Sheet1 !D3/Sheet3!D3 where the cells in Sheet 1 contained all 
of the aggregated 0 values and the cells in Sheet 3 contained all 
of the aggregated N values.'~ 
B. MDS (MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING) 
The visualizations that are Charts 4 and 5 were produced 
with the multidimensional scaling (MDS) algorithm embedded 
in the R statistical software package."" The mathematics and 
principles behind MDS have been written about extensively"1 
and will not be replicated here. Because the technique is based 
on the notion of distance, I subtracted the co-voting percentages 
from 100 to get distance integers-the larger the number, the 
greater the distance between Justices and vice-versa. Poole elo-
quently analogizes the MDS layout process to that of taking the 
mileage matrix of miles between cities found on many highway 
maps and creating a spatial distribution of the cities from that 
matrix."2 It is worth noting that with data that is not inherently 
spatial to begin with, there might be inherent stress in making 
everything fit. Also, a user can decide how many dimensions to 
which he or she wants to reduce the data with differing levels of 
stress. Because the first two dimensions capture the most vari-
ance in the data, these are what are represented in Charts 4 and 
5. 
The MDS algorithm is a deterministic process. This means 
that repeated processing of the data will produce similar spatial 
could be derived automatically from the 0 and S matrices. the author did not input the 
data for this value by hand. The same is also true for the P Method. This is true whether 
··p·· is derived by dividing ·-r· by "N" (TIN) as it was prior to the 19k7 Term or by divid-
ing "0" by "N" as it was for the 1lJH7 Term and following. 
59. See infra Table 2. 
60. Free software is available at The R Project for Statistical Computing. 
http://www.r-project.org/. 
61. See JOSEPH B. KRL.:SKAL & MYRON WISH. MUTLIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 
(197H): Blumenthal. supra note 40: Grofman & Brazill supra note 43. 
62. POOLE. supra note 43. at I. 
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distributions. (However, the image might be inverted up or 
down or left to right. It is as if the same two-dimensional slice 
through the solution space were viewed upside down or from the 
other side.) Stress tests reveal how well the variability of the data 
is captured by the chosen amount of dimensions. After conduct-
ing stress tests as to Supreme Court co-voting data, Grofman 
and Brazil were comfortable reducing all of the voting space to 
one dimension (a linear continuum) and note that a two-space 
solution "almost perfectly explain(ed) the data.""' This is fortu-
nate as two-space, or two-dimensional, solutions are perfect for 
printed visualizations. 
C. NETWORK VISUALIZATIONS 
To produce additional visualizations of the voting relation-
ships on the Court04 , I used the spring force layout algorithm 
embedded in the network analysis software Pajek."' Network 
analysis is based on nodes and links. As to my data, the Supreme 
Court Justices became the nodes, and the links between them 
were a varying quantity corresponding to their percentage co-
voting agreement. The spring force layout algorithm used by the 
software is analogous to all the nodes being pulled together by 
rubber bands with the strength of the pull (and thus the prox-
imity of the layout of the nodes) determined by the weight of the 
link. (Links are sometimes called edges and in this case are 
measure of co-voting percentages.) The layout algorithm is sto-
chastic. This means that repeated processing of the data will 
produce different images. However, with complex node and link 
structures, the resultant images look more or less the same. (The 
orientation may be different and some nodes will be slightly dif-
ferent compared to each other.) However, the advantage of the 
network layout approach is that it can accommodate instances in 
which there are no ties between nodes as in the layout of all the 
63. Grofman & Brazill. supra note 43, at 58: see also Martin et al.. supra note 34. at 
1281 n.26 ("Nearly all statistical work on the United States Supreme Court suggests that 
the issue space is single-dimensional." (citing Grofman & Brazill, supra note 43, at 58)). 
64. See infra Charts 3, 7, and 8. 
65. Networks/Pajek: Program for Large Network Analysis, http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj. 
si/pub/networks/pajek/ (providing information and links to the Pajek software); see also 
WOUTER DE NOOY ET AL., EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK 
(Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences Series No. 27, 2005): Vladimir Batagelj & An-
drej Mrvar, Pajek-Analysis and Visualization of Large Networks, in GRAPH DRAWING 
SOFrWARE 77 (Mathematics and Visualization Series, Michael JUnger & Petra Mutzel 
eds., 2003): Vladimir Batagelj & Andrej Mrvar. Pajek-Program fi" Large Network 
Analysis. 21(2) CO!'ONECTIONS 47 (1998). 
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Justices in the fifty-year dataset."" MDS, because it is based on 
distance, cannot handle such a structure in which there are enti-
ties that have no relationships. (A zero value corresponds to no 
distance and the two items are thought to be right on top of each 
other.) 
IV. OBSERVATIONS, INSIGHTS AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS 
A. AGGREGATE HARMONY METRIC 
The impetus for the Aggregate Harmony Metric is my de-
sire to produce normalized spatial visualizations of the voting 
agreement per term for the entire fifty years of the dataset. In 
other words, I want to produce visualizations similar to Charts 4 
and 5 for each Term of the Court and then combine them in an 
animation. However, it occurred to me that for the more rancor-
ous, divisive terms that the Justices should be displayed further 
apart in the voting space. Similarly, for terms with high aggre-
gate agreement, the Justices should be portrayed closer together. 
The Aggregate Harmony Metric functions as a simple means to 
make such an evaluation. 
Table 1 provides the Aggregate Harmony Metric for each 
Term of the Court in the column labeled Aggregate Percentage 
Agreement (0 Method). As can be seen from the line graph in 
Chart 1, the aggregate percentage agreement for the Court ap-
pears to seesaw through the fifty years of the dataset- from a 
low of 50% to a high of 70%. The low value of 50% is for the 
1970 Term. This was the outset of the change of direction from 
the more liberal Warren Court to the more conservative Burger 
Court. Justice Blackmun had just been appointed and was still 
voting solidly with his childhood friend," Chief Justice Burger 
(78% voting agreement using the Harvard Law Review 0 
Method"')."'' Indeed, a contemporaneous account observed that 
"the Warren Court momentum has been brought to a screeching 
halt" 711 by the two new Nixon appointees Burger and Blackmun. 
66. See infra Chart 3. 
67. LiNDA GREENHOL:SE. 8ECOMI:-.IG JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 8LACKMUN'S 
SUPREME COL:RT JOURNEY (2005). 
6K See The JIJ70 Term. supra note 2. at 351. 
69. This is in marked contrast to the voting agreement (0 Method) for the last term 
the two served together (1985). which was 48%. The 1985 Term. supra note 2. at 305. 
70. The 7970 Term. supra note 2. at 40 (citing Philip B. Kurland. The Burger Court 
Shows Its Stripes. 18 LAW SCH. REC. 7. 9 (1971) (University of Chicago Law School)). 
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At first glance, an Aggregate Harmony Metric of 50% seems 
implausible. 71 As to the 1970 Term, however, of the 122 full opin-
ions, less than 20% were unanimous (23). 72 Furthermore, "there 
were fifteen major cases ... in which the Court was so split that 
the cases were decided without a majority opinion. "73 This is in 
contrast to two such cases for each of the two previous terms. 7" 
Additionally, seven cases were decided by a four to four vote7 ' 
and there were twenty cases decided by a four to five vote. 7" 
Contrast this to the 2005 Term in which 44% of the cases 
were unanimous (36 out of 81t and there were only nine, five to 
four decisions. 7~ This "quiet" year had the highest Aggregate 
Harmony Metric (70%) of the entire fifty-term span. This was 
most likely the result of several things: (1) O'Connor participat-
ing in twenty-four of the least controversial written opinions at 
the beginning of the term while Alita was going through the con-
firmation process; (2) the transition time after O'Connor's an-
nounced retirement and Rehnquist's death in which the Court 
might have been less likely to grant certiorari in controversial 
cases; and (3) efforts as to consensus building by the new Chief 
Justice Roberts. Table 3 displays the mean, median, mode, and 
various quartile distributions for all fifty of the Aggregate Har-
mony Metric values. 
Table 4 reports the Aggregate Harmony Metric values for 
the tenure of each of the Chief Justices in the dataset. Consistent 
with the conventional understanding of the history of the Su-
preme Court, the Burger Court was a transitional time between 
the more liberal Warren Court and the more conservative 
Rehnquist Court. As might be expected, the Court of transition 
(the Burger Court) has a lower Aggregate Harmony value 
(57%) than either the Warren Court (59%) or the Rehnquist 
Court (60% ). Table 5 and Chart 2 tell a similar story at a finer 
scale of gradation (Five Term bins). One scholar has noted a 
71. Assume that there were lOU cases for the term and all were decided by a five to 
four vote by the same block of Justices in the majority and in the dissent. This would 
yield an Aggregate Harmony Metric of 2~% as the four dissenting Justices are not 
counted (using the 0 Method) as having sided with either the 5 majority Justices or each 
of themselves. Thus. IO = 1000 and IN = 3600 and the Aggregate Harmon Metric (IO/ 
IN)= .2777. 
72. The 1970 Term. supra note 2. at 34'!. 
73. /d at 352. 
74. /d. 
75. !d. at 353 
76. !d. 
77. The 2005 Term, supra note 2. at 377. 
7R /d. at 37K 
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change in the voting blocks of close decisions immediately after 
Bush v. Gore. 7" One can look at the Aggregate Harmony Metric 
values to see that the 2000 Term (the year that the divisive opin-
ion came out early in the Term) was itself higher than the me-
dian (61 %), that the 2001 Term took a dip below the median 
(58%), that the 2002 Term was well above the median (63%), 
and that the remaining Rehnquist Terms (2003 and 2004) were 
again at the median (59%). 
B. VOTING SUPERLATIVES 
One benefit of having aggregated the Harvard Law Re-
view's statistics for all fifty Terms (1956-2005) is the ability to see 
the highest and lowest voting agreement percentages between 
any two Justices over the span of the dataset. Tables 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 
8, and 9 and Chart 9 report various aspects of these voting super-
latives. One can see that Warren and Marshall are at a fifty-year 
high for those having decided more than 100 cases together 
(88%)."' Indeed, Stephen Wermiel noted Marshall's proclivity to 
vote with Brennan in his analysis of the first ten years of Justice 
Thomas's tenure on the Court in regards to the assertion that 
Thomas was a "Scalia clone."'' In fact, the percentage of voting 
agreement between Scalia and Thomas for the time range of the 
dataset is 67%.'2 This value is not even in the top twenty-five.'' 
Nor is it even in the forth quartile.,. Similarly, the polemic na-
ture of Justice Douglas is evident in the fact that he is one of the 
Justices in each of the first six, lowest voting agreement percent-
K'i 
ages. 
There is utility in such measures. For one, the data might be 
of use to those scholars evaluating the "Freshman Effect."'" 
7Y. David Cole. The Liheral Legacy of' Bush v. Gure.Y4 GEO. L.J. 1427 (2006). 
XO. See infra Table 7. 
Xl. See Wermiel. supra note 4. at 316. 
X2. See infra Table 2. 
H3. See infra Table 7. 
X4. See infra Table 10. 
XS. See infra Table H. 
Hf>. See Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb II. Reassessing the "Freshman E!Jeu": The 
Vuting Bloc Alignnzenl of New .lu.l'lices on the Uni!ed S1a1es Supreme Cuurl. 11)21-90, 15 
POL. BEHA V. 1 (1l)l)3 ): Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb. II. Freshman Opinion Wriling on 
!he US. Supreme Cour!, 1921-11)91, 76 JL'DICATURE 23l) (1')93): Saul Brenner. Anulher 
Look at Freshman lndeci.1iveness on !he Uniled Sl(l[es Supreme Cour!. 16 POLITY 320 
(19H3): Robert L. Dudley. The Freshman Efjecl and V(}[ing Alignmen!s: A Reexaminalion 
of Judicial Folklore. 21 A~. POL. RES. 360 (1993): Edward Y. Heck & Melinda Gann 
Hall. Bloc V(}[ing and !he Freshman .ftlSlice Revisiled. 43 J. POL. H52 (19H1 ): Christopher 
E. Smith. The lmpacl ol New .lu.l'lices: The U.S. Supreme Cour! and Criminal .luslice. 30 
AKRON L. REV. 55 (1YY6): .1ee also David W. Allen. V01ing Blocs and !he Freshman Jus-
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Also, it provides an empirical means of assigning labels. For in-
stance, those in the fourth quartile might be considered ideologi-
cal allies while those in the first quartile might be considered 
ideological opponents. Additionally, I plan to use the data to 
modify subsequent spatial layouts of the Justices based on their 
voting agreements. For instance, for those Justices whose voting 
agreements place them in the second and third quartiles, I plan 
to retain their actual distances as represented by the layout algo-
rithm. However, I think it would be useful to double the distance 
of those in the first quartile and halve the distances for those in 
the forth quartile."7 This "distortion" would serve to heighten the 
relationships between Justices and reveal more strongly those 
that are ideologically close together and those that are ideologi-
cally far apart. 
C. VISUALIZATIONS 
As an information science researcher, I am actively involved 
in the creation of knowledge domain visualizations (KDVs). 
KDVs are the "graphic rendering of bibliometric data designed 
to provide a global view of a particular domain, the structural 
details of a domain, the salient characteristics of a domain (its 
dynamics, most cited authors or papers, bursting concepts, etc.) 
or all three.""" KDVs (also known as domain maps) respond to 
the desire of cognitive and educational psychologists to give 
learners "a big picture, a schema, a holistic cognitive struc-
ture[.]""" Chart 3 provides such a big picture overview of the last 
fifty terms of the Supreme Court. There is an implied element of 
time moving from left to right. Viewers get a rough sense as to 
which Justices served with whom. Long serving Justices are 
pulled to the center of the diagram. 
Additionally, it is my vision that Chart 3 will soon function 
as the navigational frontispiece of an online, informational web-
site about the Court. By selecting two Justices, viewers would 
see their co-voting percentages as well as how these percentages 
compared to their contemporaries on the Court. Furthermore, 
lice on State Supreme Courts. 44 W. POL. Q. 727 (1lJlJ1 ). 
f/.7. See infra Table 10. 
HP.. PeterA. Hook & Katy Borner. Educational Knowledge Domain Visualizations: 
Tools to Navigate, Understand, and Internalize the Structure of Scholarly Knowledge and 
Expertise. in NEW DIRECfiONS IN COGNITIVE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 1H7. 1lJ4 
(Amanda Spink & Charles Cole eds .. 2005). 
f/,lJ. CHARLES K. WEST ET AL.. INSTRUCfiO:'>IAL DESIGN: IMPLICATIONS FROM 
COG~ITIVE SCIE~CE Sf/, (llJlJl ). 
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users would be able to select a particular Term and only those 
Justices that served on the Court for that Term would be high-
lighted. The rest would be grayed out. Users could then navigate 
to MDS spatial distributions of the Justices for that particular 
Term and, aggregated with data from other recent terms, the 
spatial distributions for particular topics (free speech, federal-
ism, criminal procedure, etc.) 
Charts 4 and 5 are MDS produced spatial distributions of 
the co-voting percentages in non-unanimous cases of the longest 
serving group of the same nine Justices of the entire fifty-year 
dataset (1994 to 2003 Terms) -a large chunk of the Rehnquist 
Court. Chart 4, the aggregate co-voting figures for this time 
makes the ideological landscape of the court readily available to 
a novice. One can see that Scalia and Thomas are ideological al-
lies far removed from the more liberal wing of the Court (Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer). One can readily perceive 
that Stevens is the most marginalized Justice and most apt to go 
his own way. One can also see the most pronounced five to four 
voting block for this time (O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, 
Scalia and Thomas, versus Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Breyer).'" 
Chart 5 is the MDS produced spatial distribution of the co-
voting percentages in non-unanimous cases for the same time 
period (1994 to 2003 Terms) that the Harvard Law Review has 
identified in its Table of Contents for its annual review of the 
Court Term as dealing with Freedom of Speech and Expres-
sion."' One can see that as compared to Chart 4, Stevens has 
moved from being marginalized to assuming the role of a cen-
trist. Furthermore, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas have them-
selves become marginalized and have moved away from each 
other. I do not pretend to be a constitutional scholar in the area 
of free speech. This calls attention to the issue that most visuali-
zations should be validated by experts in the field to expose er-
rors. For instance, maybe one or more of the cases identified as 
dealing with Freedom of Speech and Expression by the Harvard 
Law Review in its Table of Contents is only marginally so and 
significantly distorts the visualization. 
90. See infra Chart 6. 
91. There arc a total of twenty-five cases. which include. for example. Ashcroft v. 
ACLU. 542 U.S. 656 (2004): McConnell v. FEC. 540 U.S. 93 (2003): Virginia v. Black, 
53H U.S. 343 (2003). (Virginia v. Hicks. 539 U.S. 113 (2003). was not included because it 
was a nine to zero decision.) 
238 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:221 
Chart 6 emphasizes that O'Connor's change from one vot-
ing bloc to the next accounts for 63% of all five to four decisions 
(1994 to 2003 Terms).~2 Thus, she is a quintessential swing vote. 
Furthermore, when Kennedy votes with the four liberal Justices 
this accounts for an additional 8% of all 5 to 4 decisions.~' The 
two of them together, covering just these three different voting 
bloc scenarios, account for 71% of all 5 to 4 decisions during the 
1994 to 2003 Terms.~· The status of O'Connor and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Kennedy, as swing voters is visually portrayed in Charts 7 
and 8. In Chart 7, using the network graphic metaphor (nodes 
and edges), the lines between the Justices represent those voting 
together greater than 50% of the time in non-unanimous cases. 
This effectively communicates O'Connor's swing vote status be-
tween the liberal and conservative voting blocs for the time span. 
When the threshold is lowered by a mere percentage point as is 
the case in Chart 8, it can be seen that Kennedy also serves as an 
occasional swing vote between the liberal and conservative vot-
ing blocs. These visualizations effectively convey to a novice 
what almost every constitutional scholar or political scientist al-
ready knows. Just how effectively awaits rigorous user testing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Aggregate Harmony Metric is a tool to evaluate the 
relative rancorousness of the various terms of the Supreme 
Court. The insight from this metric is enhanced by knowledge of 
the all time high or low co-voting percentages between the Jus-
tices. Additionally, visualizations help to make the knowledge of 
veteran Court watchers quickly available and digestible to nov-
ices. All of this work responds to my desire to provide insights as 
to the Court for use in teaching (pedagogy). I think that metrics 
and visualizations can go a long way towards making the tacit 
knowledge of expert scholars of the Court available to both law 
students and the general public. Hard work, data mining, statisti-
cal data crunching, and visualization tools with built-in layout al-
92. O'Connor voted with Kennedy. Rehnquist. Scalia. and Thomas against Stevens. 
Breyer. Ginsburg. and Souter eighty-two times. O'Connor voted with Stevens, Breyer. 
Ginsburg. and Souter against Kennedy. Rehnquist. Scalia, and Thomas twenty-eight 
times. These totals. 82 plus 28 (110). account for 63% of the 175 5 to 4 votes for the time 
period. See the articles addressing the 1994 to 2003 Terms. supra note 2. 
93. Kennedy voted eight times with Stevens. Breyer. Ginsburg. and Souter against 
O'Connor. Rehnquiest. Scalia. and Thomas. See the articles addressing the 1994 to 2003 
Terms. supra note 2. 
94. This is 124 of all of the 175. 5 to 4 decisions. 
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gorithms assist in making this possible. It is my hope that the 
field of information visualization as it relates to legal topics is 
still in its infancy and ripe for substantial growth. 
Table lA- Aggregate Harmony Metric (L:O/IN) 
(1956-2005 Terms) 
Aggregate Per- Cumulative Cumulative Term Court centage Agreement 0 Count N Count (0 Method) 
Warren 3 & 4 111 2069 3631 
Warren 4 II 2351 4188 
Warren 5 • 2206 3795 
Warren 5 11 1878 3651 
Warren 5 • 2257 4120 
Warren 5 & 6 • 1672 2681 
Warren 7 .. 2245 3825 
~'.! '_ '~ '~ < 
Warren 7 
,., 
2957 4440 
Warren 7 • 1817 3146 c 
Warren 8 ... 2095 3298 
Warren 8 • 2412 4104 
Warren 9 • 2624 4023 
Warren 9 • 2389 3835 
Burger 1 a 1558 2509 
Burger 2 10 2118 4244 
Burger 3 14 2311 4279 
Burger 3 II 3140 5666 
Burger 3 • 3079 5479 
Burger 3 • 2779 4692 
Burger 3 & 4 • 2905 5050 
Burger 4 • 2693 4890 
Burger 4 51 2279 4458 
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~1978 Burger 4 55 2597 4707 
1979 Burger 4 14 2801 5193 
1980 Burger 4 14 2614 4805 
1981 Burger 5 14 3187 5887 
1982 Burger 5 • 3361 5792 
1983 Burger 5 .. 3689 5697 
1984 Burger 5 .. 3253 4965 
1985 Burger 5 56 3136 5610 
1986 Rehnquist 1 56 2998 5385 
1987 Rehnquist 2 .. 2904 4403 
1988 Rehnquist 2 61 3087 5040 
1989 Rehnquist 2 53 2633 4988 
1990 Rehnquist 3 80 2505 4192 
1991 Rehnquist 4 55 2119 3864 
1992 Rehnquist 4 63 2566 4104 
1993 Rehnquist 5 19 1830 3108 
1994 Rehnquist 6 64 1947 3041 
1995 Rehnquist 6 84 1813 2820 
1996 Rehnquist 6 61 2002 3088 
1997 Rehnquist 6 88 2261 3340 
1998 Rehnquist 6 • 1703 2900 
1999 Rehnquist 6 10 1652 2772 
2000 Rehnquist 6 61 1859 3057 
2001 Rehnquist 6 58 1665 2868 
2002 Rehnquist 6 63 1765 2784 
2003 Rehnquist 6 • 1682 2833 
2004 Rehnquist 6 • 1629 2756 
2005 Roberts 1 & 2 70 1914 2749 
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Table lB -Court Composition and Number of Full Opinions 
(1956-2005 Terms) 
Justices (When more than 9 justices are 
involved in issuing opinions for a particular 
term, those present for only part of the term 
are denoted with the number of written cases 
"Full 
Court decided in which they participated. This Opin-
number is determined by the highest number ions" 
of cases in which two justices participated 
Term 
(the Harvard N number) that includes the 
particular justice sitting for only part of a 
term.) 
1956 Black, Reed (42), Frankfurter, Douglas, Bur- 111 
ton, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Brennan, 
Whittaker (39) 
1957 Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, Clark, 119 
Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker 
1958 Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren, 112 
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart 
1959 Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren, 105 
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart 
1960 Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren, 118 
' 
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart 
1961 Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren, 96 
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker (34), Stewart, 
White (16) 
1962 Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren- 117 
nan, Stewart, White, Goldberg 
1963 Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren- 127 
nan, Stewart, White, Goldberg 
1964 Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren- 101 
nan, Stewart, White, Goldberg 
1965 Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren- 107 
nan, Stewart, White, Fortas 
1966 Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren- 119 
nan, Stewart, White, Fortas 
1967 Black, Douglas, Warren, Harlan, Brennan, 127 
Stewart, White, Fortas, Marshall 
1968 Black, Douglas, Warren, Harlan, Brennan, 122 
Stewart, White, Fortas, Marshall 
1969 Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, 94 
White, Marshall, Burger (8 JUSTICES 
ONLY) 
1970 Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, 122 
White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun 
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1971 8urger3 
1973 Burgert 
1974 BurgerJ 
1975 BurgerJA4 
1977 -· 
1978 Burgel'4 
1979 -· 
1980 -· 
1981 ........ 
1982 ........ 
1983 ........ 
1984 >Burgeri 
1985 ........ 
1986 Relmqultt 1 
1987 RelmqulttZ 
1988 Relmqultt 2 
1989 Rehnqulat 2 
1990 Relmqulttl. 
1991 Relmquilt-4 
1992 Relmqultt. 
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist 
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist 
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist 
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist 
Douglas (5), Brennan, Stewart, White, Mar-
shall, Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, 
Stevens (80) 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger, 
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger, 
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger, 
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger, 
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger, 
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, 
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, 
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, 
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, 
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, 
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy 
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Ste-
vens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter 
White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 
White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 
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Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg 
1994 ••IIJI&f:s,;; Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
, ''"·' · nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
." nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
............ , Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
'ji.,.IIUJ••• 
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
, ............ Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
............ Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
.......... Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
---1·2 Stevens, O'Connor (24), Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, 
Alito (40) 
243 
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Table lC- Superlatives (Highest & Lowest Percentage Agreement 
per Term (O Method) (1956-2005 Terms) 
Highest% Highest Lowest% Lowest% 
Term % Agree- %Agree- % Agreement Agree-
ment ment ment 
Justice 1 Justice 2 Justice 1 Justice 2 
1956 85 Reed Clark 
" 
Douglas Harlan 
1957 71 Black Warren .. Douglas Harlan 
Warren Brennan 
1958 ~ Clark Whittaker 38 Douglas Harlan 
Whittaker Stewart 
1959 78 Warren Brennan 28 Frankfurter Douglas 
1960 74 Warren Brennan 34 Frankfurter Douglas 
1961 M Clark White 71 Black Harlan 
1962 83 Warren Brennan 32 Douglas Harlan 
1963 80 Warren Brennan 4Z Black Harlan 
1964 81 Warren Brennan ~ Douglas Harlan 
1965 . ., Warren Brennan 38 Douglas Harlan 
1966 85 Warren Brennan • Douglas Harlan 
1967 80 Warren Brennan ... Black Harlan 
Douglas Harlan 
1968 82 Warren Brennan 38 Black Harlan 
Brennan Marshall 
1969 83 Brennan Marshall ... Douglas Burger 
1970 78 Burger Blackmun 38 Douglas Harlan 
1971 • Stewart 
White 28 Douglas Rehnquist 
1972 ••• Burger Blackmun 28 Douglas Rehnquist 
1973 77 Burger Rehnquist 28 Douglas Rehnquist 
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1974 77 Blackmun Powell 31 Douglas Rehnquist 
1975 18 Burger Powell 20 Douglas White 
1976 • White Powell • Brennan Burger Rehnquist Powell 
1977 12 Brennan Marshall 32 Brennan Rehnquist 
1978 70 White Blackmun 34 Brennan Rehnquist 
Burger Powell Marshall Rehnquist 
1979 .. Burger Powell 30 Marshall Rehnquist 
1980 .. White Powell 35 Marshall Rehnquist 
Burger Powell 
Burger Rehnquist 
1981 • Rehnquist O'Connor 37 Brennan Rehnquist 
1982 77 White Burger 37 Marshall Rehnquist 
Burger Powell 
1983 84 White Burger 45 Marshall Rehnquist 
Burger O'Connor 
1984 81 Burger O'Connor 47 Marshall Rehnquist 
Powell O'Connor 
1985 ... Powell O'Connor 37 Marshall Rehnquist 
1986 77 Rehnquist Powell 39 Marshall Rehnquist 
Marshall Scalia 
1987 83 White Kennedy 51 Marshall Scalia 
1988 II Rehnquist Kennedy 47 Marshall O'Connor 
1989 16 White Rehnquist 35 Marshall Scalia 
1990 83 O'Connor Souter 39 Stevens Scalia 
1991 72 Kennedy Souter 32 Blackmun Scalia 
1992 82 Rehnquist Kennedy 44 Stevens Thomas 
1993 72 Rehnquist O'Connor • Blackmun Thomas 
1994 80 Rehnquist Kennedy 41 Stevens Thomas 
1995 78 O'Connor Kennedy 43 Stevens Thomas 
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1996 83 Rehnquist Kennedy 44 Stevens Scalia 
Stevens Thomas 
1997 15 Rehnquist Kennedy 47 Stevens Scalia 
1998 76 Rehnquist O'Connor 37 Stevens Thomas 
O'Connor Kennedy 
1999 .. Rehnquist O'Connor 40 Stevens Scalia 
2000 81 Rehnquist Kennedy 40 Stevens Scalia 
2001 77 Rehnquist Kennedy 37 Souter Thomas 
2002 79 Rehnquist Kennedy 44 Stevens Thomas 
2003 78 Rehnquist O'Connor 38 Stevens Scalia 
2004 73 O'Connor Kennedy 41 Stevens Thomas 
Thomas Ginsburg 
2005 96 O'Connor Souter 45 Stevens Ali to 
75 
Chart 1- Supreme Court Aggregate Agreement by Term (1956-2005) 
(Harvard Law Review 0 Method) 
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Chart 2-- Supreme Court Aggregate Agreement by Term (1956-2005) 
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Table3: Statistics about the 50 Aggregate Harmony Metric Values 
(1956- 2005 Terms) 
(Calculated from 0 & N data from the Harvard Law Review) 
Range of Aggregate Harmony Values 50% to 70% 
Mean of Aggregate Harmony Values 59.16% 
Median of Aggregate Harmony Values 59% 
Mode of Aggregate Harmony Values 59% (7 Occurrences) 
1st Quartile 0% to 55.25% 
2nd Quartile 55.26% to 59.16 
3'd Quartile 59.16% to 62.75% 
4'" Quartile 62.76% to 100% 
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Table 4- Aggregate Co-Voting Statistics for the United States 
Supreme Court by Chief Justice Tenure (1956-2005 Terms) 
Aggregate% Cumulative Cumulative "Full Court Agreement (0 0 Count N Count Opin-Method) ions" 
Warren 
• 28,972 48,737 1481 (1956 to 1968) 
Burger S1 47,500 83,923 1418 (1969 to 1985) 
Rehnquist 80 40,620 67,343 1113 (1986 to 2004) 
Roberts (2005) 10 1914 2749 81 
Table 4A - Aggregate Co-Voting Statistics for the United States 
Supreme Court by Chief Justice Tenure: 
Superlatives (1956-2005 Terms) 
Highest% Highest Lowest% Lowest% 
Court % Agree- %Agree- % Agreement Agree-ment ment ment 
Justice 1 Justice 2 Justice 1 Justice 2 
Warren 90 Brennan Marshall 38 Frankfurter Douglas 
(1956 to Douglas Harlan 
1968) 
Burger 78 Burger O'Connor 28 Douglas Rehnquist 
(1969 to 
1985) 
Rehnquist 77 Rehnquist Powell 42 Blackmun Thomas 
(1986 to Rehnquist Kennedy 
2004) 
Roberts 98 O'Connor Souter 45 Stevens Alito 
(2005) 
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Table 5- Aggregate Co-Voting Statistics for the United States 
Supreme Court 
5 Year Bins ( 1956-2005 Terms) 
Term Court Aggre- Cumulative Cumulative Average 
gate% 0 Count N Count Yearly No. 
Agree- of"Full 
ment(O Opinions" 
Method) 
1956to Warren 56 10,761 19,385 114 
1960 
1961to Warren 82 10,786 17,390 'ttl 
1965 
1968to Warren I 59 11 '1 01 18,715 11f . 
1970 Burger 
1971 to Burger • 14,214 25,166 114 1975 
1976to Burger 54 12,984 24,053 140 
1980 
1981to Burger 59 16,626 27,951 118 
1965 
1986to Rehnquist • 14,127 24,008 131 1990 
1991to Rehnquist 81 10,275 16,937 IS 
1995 
1996to Rehnquist 83 9477 15,157 .. 
2000 
~- ~fi<- '~ , -
2001 to Rehnquist I 82 8655 13990 c. 
2005 Roberts 
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Chart 3- Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (1956-2005 Terms) 
[Spatial distribution based on the percentage of co-voting in Su-
preme Court opinions. Rendered with Pajek.] 
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Chart 4- Non-Unanimous Cases (1994-2003 Terms) (Spatial dis-
tribution based on co-voting using MDS and the software pro-
gram R.) [Photos used by permission: Collection. The Su-
preme Court Historical Society.] 
111 
Ill 
/: UOISU8W10 
c 
0 
.ij, 
c 
(j) 
E 
0 
2007] AGGREGATE HARMONY METRIC 255 
Chart 5- Freedom of Speech Cases (1994-2003 Terms) (Spatial 
distribution based on co-voting using MDS and the software 
program R.) [Photos used by permission: Collection, The Su-
preme Court Historical Society.] 
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Chart 6- Frequency of Voting Blocks in 5-4 Cases (1994-2003 
Terms) [Photos used by permission: Collection, The Supreme 
Court Historical Society.] 
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Chart 7- Thresholding (Voting Together> 50%) Reveals Ideo-
logical Cliques (1994-2003 Terms. Non-Unanimous Cases) [Pho-
tos used by permission: Collection, The Supreme Court Histori-
cal Society.] Voting frequencies represented as the edge weight 
between nodes and presented visually as a graph. (Rendered 
with Pajek using a stocahstic, spring force algorithm.) 
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Chart 8- Thresholding (Voting Together> 49%) Reveals Ideo-
logical Cliques (1994-2003 Terms, Non-Unanimous Cases) [Pho-
tos used by permission: Collection, The Supreme Court Histori-
cal Society.] Voting frequencies represented as the edge weight 
between nodes and presented visually as a graph. (Rendered 
with Pajek using a stocahstic. spring force algorithm.) 
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Table 6-25 Highest Co-Voting Percentages (1956-2005 Terms) 
(Calculated from 0 & N data from the Harvard Law Review) 
Number 
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Percentage of Cases Heard 
Together 
1 O'Connor Roberts 91 23 
2 Warren Marshall 88 178 
3 Reed Clark 85 40 
3 Fortas Marshall 85 132 
5 Warren Brennan 82 1406 
5 Scalia Roberts 82 78 
5 Roberts A lito 82 39 
8 Warren Fortas 80 391 
9 Kennedy Roberts 79 78 
9 Brennan Fortas 79 394 
11 Thomas Roberts 78 77 
12 Brennan Goldberg 77 308 
12 Rehnquist Kennedy 77 1670 
14 Burger O'Connor 76 790 
14 Warren Goldberg 76 308 
16 Warren White 75 770 
16 O'Connor Kennedy 75 1685 
18 Souter Roberts 74 78 
18 Breyer Roberts 74 78 
18 Powell O'Connor 74 888 
18 Rehnquist O'Connor 74 2669 
18 White Kennedy 74 688 
23 Ginsburg Roberts 73 78 
24 Burger Powell 72 2070 
25 Reed Warren 71 42 
25 White O'Connor 71 1694 
25 Clark Brennan 71 1169 
25 Clark White 71 537 
260 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:221 
Table 7-25 Highest Co-Voting Percentages of Justices Deciding 100 
or More Cases Together (1956-2005 Terms) (Calculated from 0 & N 
data from the Harvard Law Review) 
Number 
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Percentage of Cases Heard 
Together 
1 Warren Marshall 88 178 
2 Fortas Marshall 85 132 
3 Warren Brennan 82 1406 
4 Warren Fortas 80 391 
5 Brennan Fortas 79 394 
6 Brennan Goldber-g 77 308 
6 Rehnquist Ken neely 77 1670 
8 Buf"Qer O'Connor 76 790 
8 Warren Goldber-g 76 308 
10 Warren White 75 770 
10 O'Connor Kennedy 75 1685 
12 Powell O'Connor 74 888 
12 Rehnquist O'Connor 74 2669 
12 White Kennedy 74 688 
15 Bu!:f!er Powell 72 2070 
16 White O'Connor 71 1694 
16 Clark Brennan 71 1169 
16 Clark White 71 537 
19 White Souter 70 335 
19 Souter Ginsburg 70 1071 
19 Bur-ger Rehnquist 70 2166 
19 Powell Scalia 70 147 
19 White Powell 70 2215 
24 O'Connor Souter 69 1337 
24 Scalia Kennedy 69 1758 
24 Souter Breyer 69 976 
24 Rehnquist Scalia 69 1892 
24 Rehnquist Powell 69 2200 
24 White Burger 69 2464 
24 Clark Fortas 69 195 
24 Kennedy Souter 69 1404 
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Table 8-25 Lowest Co-Voting Percentages (1956-2005 Terms) 
(Calculated from 0 & N data from the Harvard Law Review) 
Number 
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Percentage of Cases Heard 
261 
Together 
1 Douglas Rehnquist 28 513 
2 Douglas Burger 35 792 
3 Douglas Blackmun 36 695 
4 Douglas Powell 37 495 
5 Frankfurter Douglas 38 588 
6 Douglas Harlan II 39 1633 
7 Marshall Rehnquist 41 2819 
7 Douglas Burton 41 231 
7 Black Harlan II 41 1628 
10 Blackmun Thomas 42 284 
10 Brennan Rehnquist 42 2706 
10 Douglas Whittaker 42 523 
13 Black Frankfurter 43 576 
13 Marshall Scalia 43 685 
13 Harlan II Goldberg 43 308 
16 Stevens Thomas 44 1266 
17 Stevens Ali to 45 40 
17 Black Burton 45 222 
19 Douglas Stewart 46 1963 
19 Frankfurter Warren 46 587 
19 Brennan Scalia 46 565 
19 Stevens Scalia 46 1978 
19 Marshall Burger 46 2424 
24 Black Whittaker 47 515 
24 Brennan Burqer 47 2440 
24 Marshall O'Connor 47 1462 
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Table 9-25 Most Cases Heard Together (1956-2005 Terms) 
(Calculated from theN data from the Harvard Law Review) 
Number 
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Co-Voting of Cases Percentage Heard 
Together 
1 Brennan White 59 3786 
2 Rehn_guist Stevens 51 3432 
3 White Marshall 54 3285 
4 White Blackmun 64 3257 
5 Brennan Marshall 61 3140 
6 Blackmun Rehnquist 58 3137 
7 White Rehnquist 68 3078 
8 Marshall Blackmun 53 3005 
9 Brennan Blackmun 54 2884 
10 Marshall Rehnquist 41 2819 
11 Brennan Stewart 57 2812 
12 Brennan Rehnquist 42 2706 
13 Stevens O'Connor 55 2696 
14 Rehnquist O'Connor 74 2669 
15 Blackmun Stevens 54 2536 
16 White Stevens 56 2472 
17 White Burger 69 2464 
18 Brennan Burger 47 2440 
19 Stewart White 62 2428 
20 Marshall Burger 46 2424 
21 Bur:g_er Blackmun 66 2349 
22 Marshall Stevens 50 2219 
23 White Powell 70 2215 
24 Douglas Brennan 60 2213 
25 Rehnquist Powell 69 2200 
2007) AGGREGATE HARMONY METRIC 263 
Table 10- Statistics About the 193 Justice Pairings over the 50 Years 
ofthe Dataset (1956-2005 Terms) 
Total Number of Possible Justice Pairings 193 
Range Of Co-Voting Percentages 28% to 91% 
Mean of Co-Voting Percentages 59.93% 
Median of Co-Voting Percentages 60% 
Mode of Co-Voting Percentages 58% 
(1 0 Occurrences) 
15 Quartile 0% to 53% 
2na Quartile 53.01% to 59.93% 
3'0 Quartile 59.94% to 68% 
4rn Quartile 68.01% to 100% 
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